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Governing China’s Financial Disputes in the 
Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008   
   
Hui Huang∗, Shahla Ali‡ 
 
 
ABSTRACT: In light of the recent global financial crisis of 2008, this article 
critically compares how China’s national arbitration commissions and local courts are 
responding to new challenges brought about by an increase in the number of banking 
related disputes. Drawing on comparative case analysis, the article examines the 
operation of CIETAC and the Shanghai Courts financial dispute resolution 
mechanisms in resolving financial disputes. Drawing on insights from selected case 
findings, the article provides insight into which institution is in the best position to handle 
financial-related cases, discusses prospects for coordination between the two and sets out 
proposals for further reform. Contrary to conventional wisdom indicating a general 
preference for arbitration over in-court litigation processes, initial findings suggest 
that given CIETAC’s limited exposure to banking and financial-sector disputes, in the 
immediate term, parties are advised to seek resolution through reference to local 
financial division dispute resolution mechanisms such as the financial division of the 
Shanghai Courts.  In the long term, prospects for greater strengthening of national 
mechanisms such as CIETAC and the Securities Dispute Resolution scheme will 
provide additional avenues of recourse. 
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I. Introduction   
 
The recent global financial crisis has called into question the adequacy of systems 
of financial regulation and dispute resolution at the national and supranational level. 
To date, while not immune to the fallout, China has fared relatively well in the global 
downturn which has steered all major Western economies into recession.1 However, 
this suggests by no means that China’s systems of financial governance is free of 
problems. Over the past quarter century, China’s transition to a market-based 
economy has unleashed unprecedented economic growth, and the country’s financial 
system has to develop fast to support that metamorphosis. But this transition has not 
been without limitations, nor is it complete. The healthy development and stability of 
the financial system is critical to the success of China’s further economic and social 
transformation. As such, it is imperative that China’s financial regulatory regime and 
mechanisms of financial dispute resolution be improved to meet the need of 
developing a more efficient financial system.        
This article proceeds as follows. Part II traces the historical development of 
China’s system of financial governance. This is followed by a more detailed 
discussion of the current Chinese financial governance framework including a review 
of recent CIETAC financial dispute resolution cases and cases handled by the 
Financial Division of the Shanghai Courts in Part III. The article then turns to the 
more important question of how China might consider reforming its financial 
governance regime in the future. Part IV contains a concluding remark.  
                                                 
1
 See generally: Hui Huang, ‘Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons from 
the Global Financial Crisis’ (2010) 10(1) The Journal of Corporate Law Studies 219. 
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II. A Historical Overview  
 
In order to truly appreciate how far China has advanced with respect to its systems 
of financial governance, it is essential to have a brief historical review of China’s 
financial governance mechanisms.  
A. Before 1978: Limited Financial Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the 
Communist Party of China gradually steered the nation towards a centrally planned 
economy modelled on that operating in the Soviet Union. 2  Under the so-called 
‘Socialist Transformation’ policy, private businesses were turned into collective 
ownership and eventually state ownership. Thereafter, as the economy was centrally 
planned and comprised overwhelmingly of state-own enterprises (SOE), there was 
little need for the existence of financial markets to fund businesses and allocate 
resources.  
Hence, the financial markets established before the ‘Socialist Transformation’ 
policy were dismantled during this time. First, all stock exchanges ceased to operate 
in 1952, putting an end to the securities market.3 Second, the People’s Insurance 
Company of China (PICC) was shut down in 1959, quickly followed by the closure of 
the insurance market altogether.4 Finally, in the banking sector, the People’s Bank of 
China (PBC) became the only bank operating in China both as the central bank and a 
commercial bank. Although the PBC provided the traditional service of saving and 
lending, it functioned essentially as an instrument of the government rather than a real 
commercial bank as understood in Western economies.5 The PBC was used primarily 
as a conduit through which state money was channelled to fund SOEs under the 
direction of the government. In short, there was no financial regulation in the true 
sense of the term.  
Prior to 1978, similar to the condition of financial regulation, formal legal 
institutions were largely dissolved. Prevailing thought was that, “justice should not 
be separated artificially from the masses of ordinary people by the barriers of lawyers, 
laws, and law courts.”6  Rather, “the people in their masses could judge and decide 
questions of policy as well as the concrete disputes arising in everyday life.” 7 
Systems of law were not viewed as “flexible enough to meet the needs of struggle 
under rapidly changing revolutionary conditions”8 but rather “an instrument for the 
oppression of antagonistic classes.” 9  During the 1949-1978 period, people’s 
                                                 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Hui Huang, International Securities Markets: Insider Trading Law in China (Kluwer Law 
International 2006) pp.7-8.  
4
 Linbo Fan, ‘The Insurance Market System’ in Joseph J Norton et al (eds), Financial Regulation 
in the  Greater China Area: Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong SAR (Kluwer Law International 
2000), p.158.   
5
 P Leung et al., Banking Law in the People’s Republic of China (EMIS Professional 2004) p.6.  
6
 Yan Wang, Chinese Legal Reform: The Case of Foreign Investment Law (Routledge 2002) p.22. 
7
  Ralph Haughwout Folsom and John H Minan, Law in the People's Republic of China: 
commentary, readings, and materials (Martinus Nijhoff 1989) p.12. 
8
 Carlos Winghung Lo, China’s Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng’s 
Era (Hong Kong University Press 1995) p.10. 
9 Ibid., p.257. 
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mediation was encouraged as the preferred means of resolving civil and commercial 
disputes. Largely oriented toward the infusion of Socialist ideology and reaffirming 
class struggle,10 people’s mediation was an informal avenue for promoting “correct 
thought” (si-xiang) in the context of civil dispute resolution.11  
 
B. 1978-1992: Market Regulation and Dispute Resolution 
 
Regulatory Oversight 
 
In 1978, the economic reform policy was introduced by the Third Plenary Session 
of the 11th National People’s Congress, marking an important watershed in the 
development of China’s financial markets and indeed the general economy.12 First, 
the banking system was reformed to keep up with the transition to a market-oriented 
economy. As a starting point, the ‘Big Four’ state-owned banks were established or 
re-opened to provide specialized services, including the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC) in January 1979 for the agricultural sector, the Bank of China (BOC) in March 
1979 for foreign exchange businesses, the Construction Bank of China (CBOC) in 
May 1983 for big construction projects, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) in January 1984 taking over the commercial activities of the PBC.13  
In order to increase market competition in the banking sector, more commercial 
banks were allowed to be set up at the national and local levels, most of which are 
jointly owned by the state and private investors, such as the Communication Bank in 
1987. In 1994, three policy banks, i.e., the China Development Bank, the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China, and the Export-import Bank of China, were created to 
free the ‘Big Four’ banks from the provision of policy loans, enabling them to 
function as real commercial banks.  
The other parts of the financial system also underwent significant reforms and 
developed rapidly. The securities market was brought back to life in the early 1980s, 
culminating in the establishment of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange in 1990 and 1991 respectively. Likewise, the insurance market was revived 
with the reopening of the PICC in 1980 and the formation of more insurance 
companies thereafter.    
As a consequence of the reform, the PBC took on a dual role in financial 
regulation. It performed the major functions of the central bank while at the same time 
                                                                                                                                            
 
10
 Stanley Lubman, ‘Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China’ 
(1967) 55(5) California Law Review 1284. Lubman, writing in 1967, at the peak of the Cultural 
Revolution, was one of the first to study the resolution of conflict in pre and post revolutionary China.  
His article, ‘Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China’ examined how 
disputes on a community wide basis were resolved. His primary focus centered on the 
political/revolutionary function of mediation during the early years of Communist rule (see pp.1306-
1309).  
11
 Ibid., pp.1306-1309. See further, Tsetung Mao, Selected Works (Volume 3) (Foreign Languages 
Press 1965) pp.117-122, where Mao stresses the importance of the propagation of correct ideas and the 
correction of mistaken viewpoints through rectification movements in Communist leadership. 
12
 See Hui Huang ‘Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons from the 
Global Financial Crisis’. 
13
 Yangxin Huang, ‘The Banking Market System’ in Joseph J Norton et al (eds), Financial 
Regulation in the Greater China Area: Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong SAR (Kluwer Law 
International 2000), pp.27-28. 
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supervising and regulating the whole financial system, including banking, securities 
and insurance. Thus, this effectively rendered the PBC the single financial regulator at 
that time.     
With the emergence of China’s market economy in 1978, formal and informal 
legal institutions, arbitral tribunals and professionalised mediation services 
proliferated. The Company Law, Laws on Economic Contracts, and Labor Laws were 
developed to keep pace with the development of China’s consumer-oriented 
commodity market, privatization and the specialization of labor. 14 In conjunction with 
the creation of a framework for direct foreign investment, agencies like the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC)’s role was 
expanded. 
From December 1978 (Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP) to 
September 1981, more than 200 laws were passed regulating economic and 
commercial activity.15 In light of economic reforms, Qiao Shi, the then Chairman of 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, noted that laws were 
needed to “standardize the subject in the market, regulate the relationships among 
different subjects in the market and keep fair competition, and… improve, consolidate 
macro regulations… promot[ing] harmonious economic development.” 16  
Privatization and open market reforms removed the centralization of economic 
authority, and thus the centralization of dispute-resolution authority. This could be 
seen at the local level with the transition from managerial dispute-resolution under a 
planned economy to increasingly decentralized, court-centered litigation in an open 
market system.17   
With the growth of legal regulations, the demand for formal institutions to 
adjudicate a growing number of disputes likewise intensified. The number of civil 
disputes rose to 2.4 million cases in 1990, “with most of the increase attributable to 
the rise in contract and property disputes and in suits arising out of… claims for 
personal damages…” 18  Indirectly, through transformations in the structure of the 
state, decision making power and authority became decentralized. Again, those 
working outside of the factory or work unit were no longer under the authority of the 
factory manager. Rather, external agencies were necessary to settle disputes. Regional 
arbitral bodies, such as CIETAC became increasingly active in the late 1970’s in 
response to an increasing number of commercial and trade disputes both at the 
domestic and international levels. 
Alongside the development of formal legal regulations, informal methods of 
dispute-resolution continued to receive continued support both within courts, arbitral 
bodies and informal dispute resolution structures. The renewed Chinese Civil 
Procedures Code of 1991 emphasized that mediation, if conducted, should be 
lawful.19  Chinese Legal Yearbook statistics indicated that mediation was used to 
                                                 
14 Spanogle and Baranski, ‘Chinese Commercial Dispute Resolution Methods: The State 
Commercial and Industrial Administration Bureau’ (1987) 35 American Journal of Comparative Law 
761, p.133. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 ‘To Establish the Legal Framework of Socialist Market Economy’ (1994) 12 China Law. 
17
 Mingxin Pei, ‘Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China’ (1997) 152 The China 
Quarterly 862.  
18
  Stanley Lubman, Sino-American Relations and China’s Struggle for the Rule of Law (Colombia 
University: East Asian Institute 1997) p.15. 
19
 Hualing Fu and Richard Cullen, ‘From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil 
Justice Reform in China’ (26 November 2008). Available at SSRN-id1306800. 
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resolve more than 90 per cent of all civil cases during the mid 1980s20 and nearly 60 
per cent of civil cases in the late 1990s.21  
 
C. 1992-present:  Multiple Sectors-based Regulators & Emergence 
of CIETAC 
 
With the rapid development of the financial markets since the early 1990s, China 
has been moving steadily towards a sectors-based financial regulatory model22 with 
separate regulators for banking, securities and insurance.23 First, in October 1992, 
responsibility for securities regulation was spined off from the PBC to the State 
Council Securities Commission (SCSC) and the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). These two securities regulators were merged and the surviving 
CSRC was vested with the exclusive authority to regulate the securities market in 
April 1998.24  Second, in keeping with the booming insurance market, the China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) was established in November 1998. 
Finally, in April 2003, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was set 
up to take over the function of direct banking regulation from the PBC.     
Together with the PBC as the central bank, the above three highly specialized and 
mutually independent regulatory commissions make up China’s financial regulatory 
framework, collectively referred to as ‘Yihang Sanhui’ (one bank, three commissions). 
Different regulatory commissions are responsible for the administration and 
supervision of different financial sectors, namely banking, securities and insurance. 
This sectors-based regulatory model corresponds to the segmentation of financial 
services and markets in China, a policy commonly known as ‘Fenye Jingying, Fenye 
Jianguan’ (separate operation, separate regulation).25 The adoption of this regulatory 
regime has been heavily influenced by overseas experience, particularly the US.  
In addition to an acceleration in court use, since 1992, arbitral institutions such as 
the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) have 
continued to see a growing case load in managing and resolving financial disputes. 
Since it was founded in 1956, CIETAC has administered more than 10,000 
international arbitration cases. Approximately 700 cases are filed with CIETAC each 
year, most of which are international.26  In addition to litigation through the courts and 
arbitration through CIETAC, financial disputes are resolved through provincial 
arbitral bodies such as the Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC) and local 
mediation services which will be discussed in greater detail below. 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., p.223. 
21
 Zhongguo Falu Nianjian [Law Yearbook of China] (Zhongguo Falu Nianjian She 1983-1995). 
22
 Hui Huang, ‘Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons from the Global 
Financial Crisis’. 
23
 For fuller discussion of the development of China’s financial reform after its WTO accession, 
see e.g., J Barth et al. (eds), Financial Restructuring and Reform in Post-WTO China (Kluwer 2006).   
24
 Hui Huang, International Securities Markets: Insider Trading Law in China (Kluwer Law 
International 2006) p.18-19.  
25
 See Hui Huang, ‘Financial Regulatory Modernization: Experiences and Lessons from Common 
Law Jurisdictions’ (2009) 1 Guangdong Shehui Kexue [Guangdong Social Science] 181, p.185.  
26
 See CIETAC at http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/introduction/intro_1.htm. 
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III. The Current Structure of Financial Governance in China 
 
Financial Regulatory Oversight 
 
As discussed above, the current financial regulatory structure in China has the 
defining feature of being sectors-based.27  As the central bank, the PBC assumes 
responsibility for monetary policy and the stability of the financial system generally. 
The CBRC, the CSRC and the CIRC are the authorities responsible for regulating the 
banking, securities and insurance sectors respectively. These four regulatory bodies 
will be examined below in detail.28  
First, the PBC is the central bank in China, a role legally confirmed by the Law of 
PRC on the People’s Bank of China (PBC Law).29 Pursuant to the PBC Law, the PBC 
must formulate and implement monetary policies, guard against financial risks and 
maintain financial stability under the leadership of the State Council.30 As with most 
central banks in the world, the PBC performs a threefold role: as the currency-issuing 
bank; as the bank of banks; and as the government bank.31 More specifically, the PBC 
issues the Chinese currency, namely Renminbi, and serves as a bankers’ bank for 
other banks and financial institutions. It seeks to stabilize the currency and the 
financial system by indirect, macro-economic means rather than through a direct, 
interventionist approach as it did in the planned economy era. It therefore exercises 
macro-economic control over the financial markets primarily through monetary tools 
such as deposit reserves, rediscount rate, interest rate and open market operations.32  
 Second, in 2003, the CBRC came into existence as the banking ‘watch dog’, 
taking over the role previously performed by the PBC. The legal and regulatory 
framework for banking regulation comprises the Law of the PRC on Commercial 
Banks,33 and the Law of the PRC on Banking Regulation and Supervision.34 Like its 
peers in the securities and insurance markets, the CBRC is a ministry rank unit under 
the direct leadership of the State Council.  
Third, against the backdrop of the fast-growing insurance market, the CIRC was 
set up in 1998 to assume regulatory responsibility for the insurance industry in China 
                                                 
27
 Hui Huang, ‘Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons from the Global 
Financial Crisis’. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Fa [The Law of PRC on the People’s 
Bank of China] (adopted at the 3rd session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People’s 
Congress of the PRC on 18 March 1995, amended on 27 December 2003), art.2.     
30
 PBC Law, art.2.    
31
 PBC Law, art.4. It should be noted that the State Administration of Foreign Exchange is a 
government agency under the leadership of the PBC, and it acts as the implementation branch of the 
PBC in relation to foreign exchange administration and supervision. See State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange at 
http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe/whjjs/whjjs_detail.jsp?id=1&ID=160200000000000000.  
32
 PBC Law, art.23.  
33
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa [The Law of the PRC on Commercial 
Banks] (adopted at the 13th session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People’s Congress of 
the PRC on 10 May 1995, amended on 27 December 2003).  
34
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yinhangye Jiandu Guanli Fa [The Law of the PRC on Banking 
Regulation and Supervision] (adopted at the 6th session of the Standing Committee of the 10th National 
People’s Congress of the PRC on 27 December 2003, amended on 31 October 2006).  
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under the Insurance Law of the PRC.35 Like the CBRC, the CIRC is charged with 
both market conduct regulation and prudential regulation in relation to insurance 
companies.  
Finally, the legal and regulatory framework for the securities market in China is 
largely based on the Securities Law of the PRC (Securities Law).36 As noted before, 
established in 1992 and upgraded in 1998, the CSRC is the oldest of the three 
industry-specific regulatory bodies in the financial markets and has assumed 
responsibility for securities regulation in China. It should be noted that the coverage 
of the Securities Law and therefore the authority of the CSRC is so broad as to 
include the regulation of shares, corporate bonds, treasury bonds, securities 
investment funds, and derivative products such as futures contracts, options and 
warrants.37    
 
Resolution of Financial Disputes 
 
Within the various sectors described above, both CIETAC and provincial and 
local courts, including the Shanghai Courts have developed dedicated dispute 
resolution scheme to resolve commercial and financial disputes38 .   Following a 
description of these two schemes, this section will analyse the number and types of 
cases brought to each of these institutions. 
 
A. Institutional Arbitration - CIETAC 
 
Arbitration is among the more preferred methods of financial and commercial 
dispute resolution in China39. Because ad hoc arbitration is not recognized under 
Chinese law if it takes place within China, arbitration must be conducted by an 
officially recognized arbitral institution. As a consequence, parties selecting China as 
their arbitration location will be constrained in their choice of applicable procedural 
and substantive rules, and, if an arbitration is necessary, will be required to choose 
arbitrators from lists maintained by the arbitration institution they select. 
 
Chinese Arbitration Commissions 
 
There are a number of arbitration commissions located throughout China. The 
most well known is the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC). CIETAC deals with disputes arising from economic 
transactions. In 2003, CIETAC adopted Financial Dispute Arbitration Rules, which 
specifically applies to disputes arising from, or in connection with financial 
                                                 
35
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoxian Fa [Insurance Law of the PRC] (adopted at the 14th 
session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of 
China on 30 June 1995, amended 28 October 2002 and 28 February 2009), art.9.  
36
 Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Zhengquanfa [Securities Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the 
6th session of the Standing Committee of the 9th National People’s Congress of the PRC on 29 
December 1998 and effective from 1 July 1999, amended in 2004 and 2005).  
37
 Ibid., art.2.  
38
 US Government Export Portal, ‘Dispute Avoidance and Resolution’ (China Business 
Information Centre, export.gov, 23 January 2011) 
(http://www.export.gov/china/exporting_to_china/disputeavoidanceandresolution.pdf). 
39
 Shoushuang Li, ‘Insight into Commercial Dispute Resolution in China’ (2007) Hong Kong 
Lawyer. 
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transactions40 between parties41.  While, as yet, there are no special programs set up 
after the financial crisis, nevertheless CIETAC has indicated an intention to carry out 
further amendments to the CIETAC Arbitration Rules in accordance with 
developments in the PRC markets by requesting submission of proposals in late 
200942.  
CIETAC was founded in April 1956 by the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade (CCPIT) to meet the needs of the continuing development of 
China’s economic and trade relations with foreign countries after adopting its “open 
door” policy.43 CIETAC’s main headquarters are located in Beijing with three sub-
commissions in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Tianjin respectively known as the CIETAC 
Shanghai Sub-Commission, the CIETAC South China Sub-Commission and CIETAC 
Financial Arbitration Center in Tianjin.44 CIETAC also successively established 21 
liaison offices in different regions and specific business sectors. Within each of 
CIETAC’s headquarters and each of its sub-commissions is a secretariat established 
to handle logistical matters and daily affairs under the leadership of their respective 
secretaries-general.45  
In addition to CIETAC, there are over 140 local arbitration commissions that have 
been established in most major cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen 46 . Many local arbitration commissions have established specialized 
financial arbitration divisions in recognition of the growing demand for financial 
dispute settlement. The first specialized financial arbitration commission was set up in 
Shanghai in December 2007, followed by Guangdong, Chongqing, Wuhan and 
Hangzhou 47 . The spokesperson for Chongqing Financial Arbitration Commission 
envisaged that PRC citizens may seek the assistance of these financial arbitration 
commissions when faced with abusive bank practice48. It is also expected that the 
Shenzhen Arbitration Commission will follow suit this year49. 
 
 
The CIETC Financial Dispute Resolution System 
 
Besides making prominent contributions to the legislation of the Chinese 
Arbitration Law and the development of the arbitration practice in China, CIETAC 
has also set up a financial dispute resolution system to deal with financial disputes 
                                                 
40
 Article 3 of the CIETAC Financial Dispute Arbitration Rules. 
41
 Sanzhu Zhu, Securities Dispute Resolution in China (Ashgate  2007) p.229. 
42
 See CIETAC at http://cn.cietac.org/NewsFiles/NewsDetail.asp?NewsID=896 [Chinese] accessed 
26 August 2011. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 See note 1. 
47
 Yaya Jiang, Ying Liu and Yibo Lu, ‘Establishment of the Shanghai Financial Arbitration 
Commission’ (Shanghai Arbitration Research Centre, 19 December 2007) 
(http://www.arsh.sjtu.edu.cn/view_news.jsp?newsid=77) [Chinese] accessed 26 August 2011. 
48
 Chongqing Daily, ‘Yu Chengli Xibu Shoujia Jinrong Zhongcaiyuan, Shu Guonei Di’er 
Zhuanmen Jigou [The Establishment of the First Arbitration Institution in the West of China, 
Chongqing, the Second Largest Specialized Institution in the Country]’ (www.cq.xinhanet.com, 29 
July 2010) (http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/business/2010-07/29/content_20471602.htm) [Chinese] 
accessed 26 August 2011. 
49
 Shenzhen Arbitration Commission, ‘Introduction of the Shenzhen Financial Arbitration 
Commission’ (www.fabao365.net, 12 January 2010) (http://www.fabao365.com/news/657785.html) 
[Chinese] accessed 26 August 2011. 
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across the nation. CIETAC has issued a set of Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules 
which serve as an expeditious and professional method for resolving financial 
disputes.  
 
A Closer Look at the Rules 
On 17 March 2005, CIETAC issued the “China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules” (hereafter “the Rules”) 
which were revised and Adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce and became effective 
starting from 1 May 2005.  According to art.1 of the Rules, these rules were 
formulated “for the purpose of impartial and prompt resolution of disputes arising 
from financial transactions between the parties.” These rules apply to the arbitrations 
of disputes “arising from, or in connection with, financial transactions between the 
parties”.  Article 2 of the Rules then goes on to define “financial transaction” as  
“transactions arising between financial institutions inter se, or arising between 
financial institutions and other natural or legal persons in the currency, capital, 
foreign exchange, gold and insurance markets that relate to financing in both 
domestic and foreign currencies, and the assignment and sale of financial 
instruments and documents denominated in both domestic and foreign 
currencies, including but not limited to: loans, deposit certificates, guarantees, 
letters of credit, negotiable instruments, fund transactions and fund trusts, 
bonds, collection and remittance of foreign currencies, factoring, 
reimbursement agreements between banks, and securities and futures.  
The parties to a transaction are encouraged to specify their intended dispute 
resolution method expressly in their agreement. However, in cases where the parties 
agree to refer their disputes to arbitration under the Rules without providing the name 
of an arbitration institution, according to art.4, they shall “be deemed to have agreed 
to refer the dispute to arbitration by CIETAC”. This makes CIETAC one of the most 
commonly used means of arbitrating financial transactions.  
Besides allowing parties to state expressly their intention to have their financial 
disputes resolved by a particular body, the Rules also allow parties to appoint any 
arbitrator, at their discretion, from a Panel of Arbitrators in the Financial Industry of 
CIETAC, or from such Panel of Arbitrators as may be designated by CIETAC. 
However, the appointment of arbitrators by the parties is not final as it is subject to 
the confirmation by the CIETAC Chairman, who makes the final decision. CIETAC 
has engaged over 100 experts and distinguished personnel in the field of finance as 
arbitrators. These experts have diverse cultural backgrounds. While most of them are 
from mainland China, a small number of them are from HKSAR, Macau SAR, as well 
 11 
as from other parts of the world such as Canada, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and some EU countries such as France and the Netherlands. They usually are 
experts in the fields of Contract Law, Banking Law, Arbitration Law, Company Law, 
Trade Law, and Commercial Law, as shown in the list of arbitrators.  Article 12 of the 
Rules provides that the arbitral tribunal shall be composed of either one or three 
arbitrators. Where the parties have not agreed upon the number of arbitrators in 
advance, the final decision power will rest in the CIETAC Chairman. 
According to art.12, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal 
shall render an arbitral award within 45 working days from the date on which the 
arbitral tribunal is constituted. At the request of the arbitral tribunal, the Secretary-
General of CIETAC may extend the time period as needed. However, the extension 
may not exceed 20 working days. 
In deciding a case, the arbitration tribunal will take into account the terms of the 
contract, the general usages and standard practices of specific business sectors, and 
abide by the principles of fairness and reasonableness.  If the parties in a case involve 
a foreign-related element, the parties may, subject to the mandatory provisions of law, 
choose the law to be applied to the merits of the dispute. In cases of lack of such 
agreement, the tribunal will then apply the law as it deems appropriate in the situation.  
It is however worth noting that the Rules here do not necessarily cover all 
situations. In cases which are not covered by the Rules, the Arbitration Rules of 
CIETAC shall apply as a fall back. 
First case accepted by CIETAC Tianjin International Economic and Financial  
Arbitration Center 
 
On 10 December 2008, the Tianjin International Economic and 
Financial Arbitration Center of CIETAC accepted its first case.50  The case was about 
a dispute over a sale of goods contract which involved nearly 9 million Yuan. This 
was the first case handled by the Tianjin office after its establishment in May in the 
same year.  The Tianjin office was set up to cater to the strategic development of 
the new Bohai district of Tianjin, to provide a legal framework for the newly 
developed Binhai New District as an international financial center, and to allow 
CIETAC to play more important role for China so as to enable local and 
foreign enterprises to have their disputes resolved by a fair and 
convenient commercial dispute resolution mechanism.  
 
 
                                                 
50
 ‘Maozhong Tianjin Guoji Jinji Jinrong Songcai Zhongxin Shouli Diyi’an [The First Case 
accepted by Tianjin International Economic and Financial Arbitration Center]’ (Tianjin International 
Economic and Financial Arbitration Center of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission, 10 December 2008) (http://www.cietac-tj.org/newsfiles/NewsDetail.asp?NewsID=45) 
[Chinese] accessed 26 August 2011. 
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Recent CIETAC Financial and Commercial Dispute Resolution Cases 
 
Below is a selection of CIETAC’s recent financial and commercial cases.  What 
can be observed from these cases is the following: Most all of the cases involve issues 
relating to the sale of goods, capital contributions, lease contracts etc.  As a result, 
CIETAC has had limited exposure to banking related cases.  Nevertheless, for the 
cases it has handle it has achieved a relatively uniform process of case handling 
through reference to commercial agreements, existing law and trade practice.  
 
1. Dispute over capital contribution in a Joint Venture51 (Published 2009) 
 
This case involved a dispute between two parties who signed an agreement to 
establish a limited liability entertainment company.  The contract required both 
parties to contribute capital, including a one-time payment of registered capital 
made within five months of acquiring the necessary license to conduct business. 
The claimant alleged that the respondent was unable to fulfill its obligations 
because the property it intended to provide as capital belonged to the government 
of the district where the joint venture was located and the government had already 
mortgaged it to a bank. The respondent counter argued that the claimant had not 
fully contributed the amount of capital required by the contract: the foreign 
exchange that it had originally promised to contribute was not paid and the 
equipment provided fell short of the required amount.  
 
According to the terms of the contract, the Claimant referred the matter to 
CIETAC for arbitration.  
 
The arbitral tribunal found that the respondent did not have legal rights to the 
property as its capital contribution and hence did not carry its investment 
obligations. The claimant also did not completely execute its investment 
obligations under the terms of the contract. Therefore, the tribunal determined that 
the joint venture contract should be terminated and the claimant’s requests for 
compensation should be rejected.  
 
Here the subject matter of the dispute, a capital contribution agreement, is more 
commercial, rather than financial in nature.  The case determination was made 
primarily on the basis of the terms of the contract.  Therefore, parties are advised 
to consider such terms carefully, in light of future adjudication.   
 
2. Dispute over a Contract for the Sale of Goods―Contract Revision and Reserving 
the Right to Seek Compensation for Damages52 (Published 2009) 
 
This case involved a dispute between a claimant and a respondent (French 
company) who signed a contract for the sale of glass production equipment which 
the claimant intended for resale to its partner companies in China in February 
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 ‘Dispute Over Capital Contribution in a Joint Venture’ (Case Studies, References, CIETAC, 15 
July 2009) ( HYPERLINK "http://www.cietac.org/index.cms" 
http://www.cietac.org/index.cms) accessed 26 August 2011. 
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 ‘Dispute Over a Contract for the Sale of Goods―Contract Revision and Reserving the Right to 
Seek Compensation for Damages’ (Case Studies, References, CIETAC, 15 July 2009) 
(http://www.cietac.org/index.cms) accessed 26 August 2011. 
 13 
1996. The contract required the claimant buyer open an irrevocable letter of credit 
for the full contract price with the respondent seller 60 days before the loading. 
The claimant opened a letter of credit as required by the contract but the 
respondent failed to deliver the equipment according to schedule. When the 
respondent finally delivered the equipment one and a half months later, the 
claimant demanded that the respondent pay penalties according to the contract for 
late delivery of goods and sought additional compensation on the basis that the 
respondent’s late delivery had caused the claimant to violate its resale contracts 
with its partner companies and the cost of altering the letter of credit. The 
claimant argued that revision of the letter of credit was independent of the main 
contract therefore it did not amount to revision of the contract while the 
respondent argued that the revision of the letter of credit extended the original 
date of delivery in the contract.  
 
The arbitral tribunal found that although the letter of credit exists independently of 
the main body of the contract, it still originates from the contract. Generally 
speaking, revision of the major articles of the contract such as the date of delivery 
of goods, should be viewed as equivalent to the revision of the contract itself. A 
party may agree to revise a letter of credit with or without conditions, it should 
protect its right to seek compensation by expressly reserving its right to seek 
compensation later based on the provisions of the contract. If a party seeks to 
revise a letter of credit without reservation it abandons its right to seek 
compensation in the future. Therefore the claimant lost its contractual right to seek 
compensation from respondent based on late delivery of goods as the respondent 
delivered the equipment within the time limit set by the revised letter of credit. 
 
Here CIETAC primarily considered the parties initial and subsequent revisions to 
its contract and reasoned that revision to the LOC without conditions amounted to 
a change in the underlying contract itself and therefore the claimant was not 
entitled to damages. 
 
3. Lease Contract Dispute―Obvious Loss of Fairness and the Exercise of the Right 
to Revoke a Contract (Published 2009)53 
  
The claimant, a Hong Kong citizen, and the respondent, a Beijing-based real 
estate company, signed a contract in 1996 where the claimant agreed to lease the 
respondent its property in Beijing. Before the contract was signed, the respondent 
agreed to sublet the property to a department store. According to the contract, if 
the rent obtained by the respondent from subletting the property exceeded a 
certain minimum amount, the respondent could claim the remainder, if the rent 
fell under the minimum amount, the respondent was required to pay the remainder 
to the claimant. In 1999, the claimant applied to CIETAC for arbitration on the 
basis that the respondent failed to pay the required amount of rent. The respondent 
argued that the sum it was required to pay by the contract far exceeded the amount 
of rent it obtained from the sublease, therefore the contract had lost its fairness 
under art.5 of the Contract Law of PRC and should be revoked. 
 
                                                 
53
 ‘Lease Contract Dispute―Obvious Loss of Fairness and the Exercise of the Right to Revoke a 
Contract’ (Case Studies, References, CIETAC, 15 July 2009) (http://www.cietac.org/index.cms) 
accessed 26 August 2011. 
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The arbitral tribunal found that as the contract contained explicit provisions 
regarding the calculation and payment of rent, the respondent still had the 
obligation to pay the minimum required rent to the claimant regardless of how 
much rent the respondent obtained from the sublease. When the respondent signed 
the lease contract with the claimant, it had already agreed to sublet the property 
for a third party for an amount less than the rent it would have to pay to the 
claimant so the respondent was clearly aware of the price differential. Also 
according to arts.54 and 55 of the Contract Law, if a contract loses equality, a 
party has the right to request that the court or arbitral tribunal permit modification 
or revocation of the contract within one year of when it knew or should have 
known that it had cause to do so. As the respondent did not attempt to exercise its 
right until 3 years after signing the contract, the respondent had lost its right to 
seek revocation even if the contract had actually become unfair.  
 
This case, which primarily involves a lease and sublease agreement, primarily 
revolved around the running of a limitations time period.  Because the respondent 
waited until 3 years after signing the contract, he lost his right to seek revocation. 
 
4. Execution of Duties in a Contract for the International Sale of Goods54 
 
The claimant seller and the respondent buyer signed a contract under which the 
claimant agreed to supply the respondent with five thousand tons of peanuts. The 
contract required the buyer to open an irrevocable, transferable letter of credit 
with the seller as beneficiary 15 days before the loading date. The respondent 
failed to open a letter of credit and cancelled the contract on the ground that there 
was insufficient time to arrange the loading of the ship. The claimant sought 
compensation for damages. The respondent’s failure to open the letter of credit 
and arrange shipping forced the claimant to convert product into peanut oil 
resulting in financial losses. The respondent counter argued that examination of 
the goods before the loading period indicted that the product did not meet the 
required standard and hence it did not open a letter of credit.  
 
The arbitral tribunal confirmed the claimant’s request for compensation resulting 
from the respondent’s fundamental breach of contract from failing to open the 
letter of credit. Regardless of the usual practice with the claimant where the letter 
of credit will only be opened after the parties examined the product together and 
determined the required standard was met, contractual obligations always 
supersede implicit understanding.  
 
Here CIETAC is relying first on the contract as stated as opposed to industry 
practice.  Because the opening of a letter of credit was not contingent on product 
quality, the respondent was contractually bound to open the letter of credit.  As he 
failed to do so, he was in breach of the contract.   
 
Assessment of Cases 
 
                                                 
54
 ‘Problem in the Sequence of the Execution of Duties in a Contract for the International Sale of 
Goods’ (Case Studies, References, CIETAC, 16 July 2009) (http://www.cietac.org/index.cms) accessed 
26 August 2011.  
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As can be seen from the above sample of CIETAC cases, the majority of those 
cited deal with some variation of a contractual dispute whether it be sale of goods, 
the opening of a letter of credit, subleasing agreements or product quality.  None 
of the cases reviewed above directly involve banking or financing related disputes.  
While CIETAC maintains a list of highly qualified and well established financial 
dispute resolution practitioners, given the limited number of finance related cases 
thus far having been referred to CIETAC, a question arises as to the preparation of 
CIETAC on the whole to handle financial and banking related matters.  
 
Why might the number of financial dispute resolution cases brought to CIETAC 
be low?  In general, CIETAC is amongst the most well known arbitral institutions 
in China and the first to introduce a financial dispute resolution system.  Therefore, 
it is not due to lack of awareness or the absence of a specialized program that has 
deterred users.  One reason might be that CIETAC case handling fees are less 
expensive when compared with other international arbitration venues, but relative 
to general income levels in China, CIETAC fees can be high.  As a result, case 
fees may be a deterrent to mid-size businesses and sole proprietorships. 
  
 
 
B. Shanghai Courts ― Financial Division 
 
In relation to CIETAC, the number of financial disputes brought to the Shanghai 
Courts is far greater and more varied.  This has provided the Shanghai Courts with 
greater exposure to a diverse array of financial and corporate claims. 
 
Background 
 
On 12 April 2011, the Shanghai High Court issued a series of white papers on 
trials of financial cases in 201055.  
 
According to the white paper, the Shanghai Courts handled a total of 22,278 
financial and commercial dispute cases (of those 22,234 were closed), an increase 
of 29.64 per cent from the previous year.  The cases involved a total amount of 
6.465 billion RMB.   Of these cases, 359 were heard on appeal, an increase of 
13.97 per cent over the previous year. Most involved disputes concerning credit 
cards, loan agreements, bank deposits, insurance contracts, bills, securities, 
financial leasing arrangements and management of trust funds56. 
 
The Courts also handled a total of 1,165 financial criminal cases in 2010, of which 
1,153 were closed.  This represented an increase of 38.3 per cent over the previous 
year. The cases involved crimes of credit card fraud, bill fraud, sales, purchase and 
transportation of counterfeit money, illegal operations, holding and using 
counterfeit money, illegal absorption of public deposits and interference with 
credit card management.  
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 ‘Press Conference on the Issue of White Papers’ (Shanghai No.2 Intermediate People’s Court), 
(http://www.shezfy.com/view.html?id=55150) [Chinese] accessed 26 August 2011. 
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Becomes the Most Common Financial Crime]’ (http://www.sina.com.cn, 11 March 2011) 
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Relevant Cases 
 
Below is a sample of relevant cases handled by the Financial Division of the 
Shanghai Courts.  The sample illustrates the growing depth and breadth of 
experience in handling financial related issues and the use of mediation in some 
cases.  
 
1. Abuse of majority shareholder power (Published 2008)57  
 
This case involved a plaintiff and defendant who were originally the only two 
shareholders in a company with registered capital of 21 million RMB, holding 15 
per cent and 85 per cent stakes respectively. Under the pretext of addressing 
company liquidity problems, the defendant who was also the majority shareholder 
held several shareholder meetings between April and September 2005 to approve 
the injection of capital by itself and a third party “strategic partner” company. The 
capital injection allowed the defendant to increase his stake in the company to 
73.7 per cent and the third party “strategic partner” company obtained 20 per cent 
while the minority shareholder stake was reduced to 6.3 per cent. The plaintiff 
sued the defendant for abuse of the position of majority shareholder.  
 
The appeal court, in consideration of the deteriorated relationship between the two 
parties, persuaded them to reach a mediation agreement where the defendant 
agreed to purchase the plaintiff’s entire equity interest and pay the plaintiff a one-
off compensation of 6.1 million RMB.  
 
2. Request for winding up of company (Published 2006)58 
 
This case involved a claim by Plaintiff subsidiary company against its parent 
company (the defendant).  The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant parent 
company refused to hold shareholder and director meetings resulting in severe 
difficulties in the management and normal operation of the company.  
 
After a review of the facts, the court held for the defendant, indicating that the 
plaintiffs should also bear responsibility for the unfavourable management state of 
the company which was partly attributed to their breach of contract.   
 
3. Fraudulent shareholder investment59 
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 ‘Appeal on Dispute over Compensation for the Abuse of Majority Shareholder Power [(2008) 
Shanghai No.2 Intermediate People’s Court, Third Civil Division (Commercial Case), Final Ruling, 
Case No.238] [3 September 2008]’ (The Selected Case List, Shanghai No.2 Intermediate People’s 
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 ‘Request for Winding up of Company [(2006) Shanghai No.2 Intermediate People’s Court, Third 
Civil Division (Commercial Division), Initial Ruling, Case No.76] [8 September 2006]’ (The Selected 
Case List, Shanghai No.2 Intermediate People’s Court), 
(http://www.shezfy.com/view/jpa/detail.html?id=111 [Chinese]) accessed 26 August 2011. 
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This case involved a joint venture agreement entered into by two defendants in 
June 1999. Although the official registration records indicated that the company 
had registered capital of 5 million RMB, the two defendant shareholders had in 
fact paid nothing. In 2004, the company increased its registered investment capital 
to 10 million RMB, with the two shareholder’s funding obligations still 
unfulfilled. A debt crisis hit the company and the suppliers, bank and other 
debtors sued the company and its two shareholders.  
 
The court held that shareholders were required to pay the full contribution in order 
to set up a company. As the company’s actual capital was below that of the legal 
minimum, its corporate status was not established and the defendant shareholders 
were, as a result, jointly and severally liable for the company’s debts.  
 
4. Breach of fiduciary duty by management60 
 
This case involved a dispute between a defendant manager for a foreign company 
responsible for the company’s sales in the South China region and the foreign 
company. In the course of his employment, the defendant obtained profits for 
himself through side dealing and fraudulent means. The company dismissed the 
defendant and sued him for compensation of losses suffered by the company.  
 
The court held that the defendant owed duties of loyalty (including a prohibition 
against self-dealing) to the company. As a result of the defendants breach, the 
court ordered him to disgorge any profits and compensate the company for the 
losses it suffered. 
 
5. Company refusal to award shareholder dividends 
 
This case involved a dispute between a shareholder (the plaintiff) and his 
company (the defendant). In Jan 2008, the plaintiff was arrested and held under 
custody for a crime that he was subsequently acquitted of. During the period of 
custody, the defendant company distributed shareholder dividends for the year of 
2007 to all shareholders except the plaintiff.  The plaintiff sought a payment of his 
dividends after his release. 
 
The court held that shareholder rights are not affected even when a shareholder is 
under custody by the police. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff his 
dividends accordingly.  
 
6. Company deregistration prior to liquidation 
 
This case involved a plaintiff real estate company which was set up in 1999 and 
de-registered in March 2006. During the period when the company was in 
operation, it purchased 0.5 million RMB worth of construction materials from the 
defendant, which remained unpaid at the time of deregistration.  
 
The court held that even after a company is deregistered and wound up, the 
shareholders are still under the responsibility to liquidate the company according 
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 Ibid. 
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to law. The court ordered the shareholders to compensate the defendant for any 
losses suffered due to the non-payment for the materials.61  
 
Summary 
 
The Financial Division of the Shanghai Courts has handled a wide range of 
banking, corporate and financial cases.  In addition to the above-cited sample, the 
court has handled an additional 242,686 civil disputes including financial cases.62  
Case handling fees are lower than CIETAC arbitration filing fees.  Comparing the 
case type and volume with CIETAC, one can readily observe that the financial 
division of the Shanghai Courts has clearly had greater exposure, experience and 
familiarity with financial disputes.  Therefore, the authors are of the view that 
given CIETAC’s limited exposure to banking and financial-sector disputes, in the 
immediate term, parties are advised to seek resolution through reference to local 
financial division dispute resolution mechanisms such as the financial division of 
the Shanghai Courts.  In the long term, prospects for greater strengthening of 
national mechanisms such as CIETAC and the Securities Dispute Resolution 
scheme will provide additional avenues of recourse. 
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IV. Lessons from the global financial crisis  
What lessons can be learned from the global financial crisis? How can such 
lessons be applied to the development of China’s financial governance systems in the 
future? Although China’s financial markets and institutions have been affected by the 
global financial crisis, the impact appears less direct and less severe than is the case 
with overseas markets.63 The Chinese financial system as a whole has survived the 
crisis in relatively good shape: no major financial institutions have fallen and no 
major scandals over transactions of complex financial products have occurred. The 
losses suffered by Chinese financial institutions are essentially the consequence of 
their ill-fated investment in overseas markets rather than in domestic markets. Further, 
the overall risk exposure of China’s financial institutions and listed companies in 
overseas markets is quite limited and manageable. 
However, one would be wrong to believe, judging from the relatively good health 
of the Chinese financial markets following the financial crisis, that China’s financial 
regulatory system is problem-free. Rather, a closer examination reveals the irony that 
the good fortune of China’s financial system in this financial crisis is largely 
attributable to the relative simplicity of its financial products and isolation from the 
global economy.  
To begin with, the Chinese financial markets continue to have much room for 
development. At present, the financial products traded on the Chinese financial 
markets are limited and the technology of securitization is yet to be widely used. 
There are some traditional financial derivatives in China such as options and warrants, 
but they are far fewer than those found in overseas markets and far less sophisticated 
than their overseas counterparts, including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 
collateralised loan obligations (CLOs) and synthetic CDOs. As securitization and 
complex financial instruments have now been identified as one of the core causes of 
the current financial crisis,64 it is not hard to understand why China’s financial system 
has not suffered any home-grown problems.  
On the other hand, the isolation of the Chinese financial system from the outside 
world has helped to stop the flow-on effect of the financial crisis in China.  Although 
China has worked to open up its financial markets since its accession to the WTO, this 
process is gradual, cautious and ongoing. For the time being, foreigners have limited 
access to the Chinese financial markets. For example, foreign investors cannot trade 
in China’s stock market except through several designated means such as the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII).65 Further, the Chinese government 
still exerts tight control over its currency policy. For instance, there are restrictions on 
capital accounts; the Chinese currency, the renminbi or yuan, is not fully convertible 
yet; the exchange rate is set in a managed floating range. All these measures have 
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collectively operated as a firewall to insulate China’s financial system from the spills 
of the financial crisis overseas.      
China can take some comfort from the fact that its financial system has sustained 
relatively modest losses in the current financial crisis, however it should not be 
overjoyed about its lucky escape, overlooking the real problems it has faced. As 
observed by the People’s Bank Governor, the fault of the previous crisis was “not in 
the technical sophistication of the products” but rather arose from “problems in 
information disclosure or the pricing mechanisms.”66 Some have observed that the 
technology of securitization and financial derivatives, if used and regulated properly, 
can make the market more efficient and effective.67 China is thus best advised to 
further develop its financial markets by investigating the applicability of such 
financial tools, while at the same time strengthening its regulatory system to avoid 
abuse.  
What is required is a more effective regulatory framework that can take on the 
increasingly complex challenge of providing coordinated supervision of innovative 
financial products and multi-service financial groups.  This challenge has been 
acknowledged worldwide as tall order inasmuch as federal regulators now admit that 
in relation to the most recent financial crisis, “neither the investors, nor the rating 
agencies, nor the regulators, nor even the firms that designed the securities fully 
appreciated the risks those securities entailed…in part because the regulators – like 
most financial firms and investors – did not fully understand or appreciate them.”68 As 
discussed earlier, China presently adopts a traditional sectoral system of financial 
regulation, which has exhibited several inadequacies in meeting the regulatory 
challenges in a rapidly changing market. This author has discussed the issue 
elsewhere through a comparative analysis of the relevant experiences in some 
advanced economies including the US, the UK and Australia. Each of these 
jurisdictions represents a different regulatory approach, namely the ‘multiple-
regulators’ model or ‘sectoral regulation’ model in the US, the ‘single-regulator’ 
model or ‘integrated regulation’ model in the UK, and the ‘twin-peaks’ model or 
‘objectives-based regulation’ model in Australia. When looking to overseas regulatory 
models for guidance, regard must be taken not only of their advantages and 
disadvantages, but also of the local conditions in China. This author suggests that the 
US model merits consideration in the short term, and that with further growth of 
China’s financial markets in the long run the Australian model provides the preferred 
direction for reform.69 
With regard to China’s systems of financial dispute resolution, following the 
financial crisis, China saw the emergence of CIETAC’s financial dispute resolution 
mechanism. The question remains, despite conventional wisdom favouring private 
arbitration over in-court litigation, why might the number of financial dispute 
resolution cases brought to CIETAC be low?  In general, CIETAC is amongst the 
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most well known arbitral institutions in China and the first to introduce a financial 
dispute resolution system.  Therefore, it is not due to lack of awareness or the absence 
of a specialized program that has deterred users.  One reason might be that CIETAC 
case handling fees are less expensive when compared with other international 
arbitration venues, but for domestic cases CIETAC fees can be high.70  As a result, 
case fees may be a deterrent to mid-size businesses and sole proprietorships.  Going 
forward, CIETAC may consider a sliding scale fee for mid-size businesses and sole 
proprietorships.  In addition, because pre-dispute arbitration clauses in standard-form 
contracts can be held invalid in a number of circumstances under the PRC Law71, this 
presents an additional barrier to CIETAC use by small/mid-size businesses.  It is 
possible to “tick the box” to select arbitration, but in practice, few people choose to do 
this.  Therefore, greater awareness is needed among small businesses regarding the 
benefits of arbitration as well as a commensurate sliding scale fee to make the 
arbitration process more accessible. 
Despite handling a limited number of cases, CIETAC has been generally effective 
in providing a forum for the resolution of commercial disputes, while its hearing of 
financial related disputes continues to have much scope for growth.  In order to 
further strengthen CIETAC’s role in providing a venue for the resolution of financial 
related disputes, there is a need to provide further training to arbitrators so that they 
become well versed in financial systems, laws and regulations. 72   In addition, 
CIETAC may consider drafting a general model clause for use in financial product 
sales contracts. This will make CIETAC a more attractive venue of the resolution of 
financial disputes. 
On the other hand, the Financial Division of the Shanghai Courts has handled a 
wide range of banking, corporate and financial cases.  In addition to the above-cited 
sample, the court has handled an additional 242,686 civil disputes including financial 
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cases.73  Comparing the case type and volume with CIETAC, one can readily observe 
that the financial division of the Shanghai Courts has clearly had greater exposure, 
experience and familiarity with financial disputes.  
With respect to both CIETAC and the Financial Division of the Shanghai Courts, 
further training and development is necessary. It is suggested that a comprehensive 
financial dispute resolution training program consider the inclusion of both a course 
based program followed by an examination and an in-person evaluation program.  
The course content could include topics such as:  the arbitration process, ethical 
considerations, how to determine potential conflicts of interest, managing the hearing 
process, fairness and impartiality, determining the facts of a case and the relevant law, 
and drafting an award.  Such a training program will enhance the competency of the 
arbitrators and the confidence of the parties in the proceedings. 
In addition to a comprehensive training program, proving potential parties with a 
draft clause to include in their contractual agreements will provide a clear route to 
resolution.  The following essential elements must be included in a valid arbitration 
clause:  the administering institution, the arbitration rules, reference to any dispute 
arising out of the agreement, the place (seat) of arbitration, the number of arbitrators, 
the method of selection and replacement of arbitrators, the language of arbitration and 
the rules of law governing the contract.  In addition to these essential elements, the 
parties may also consider including terms such as the allocation of costs, time limits 
and discovery considerations. 
The authors are of the view that given CIETAC’s limited exposure to banking and 
financial-sector disputes, in the immediate term, parties are advised to seek resolution 
through reference to local financial division dispute resolution mechanisms such as 
the financial division of the Shanghai Courts.  In the long term, prospects for greater 
strengthening of national mechanisms such as CIETAC and the Securities Dispute 
Resolution scheme will provide additional avenues of recourse. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion  
The article has shown that China’s systems of financial dispute resolution and 
regulation has undergone significant changes since economic reforms in the late 
1990s. The current Chinese regulatory regime is broadly similar to its United States 
counterpart, adopting a traditional sectoral regulatory structure. It comprises the PBC 
as the central bank and three sector-specific regulators, namely the CBRC, the CSRC, 
and the CIRC responsible for banking, securities and insurance respectively.  
Similarly, its financial dispute resolution structures are just emerging at the provincial 
level as specialized programs within courts and arbitral tribunals.  
The authors recommend that in the short term, given CIETAC’s limited exposure 
to banking and financial-sector disputes, parties are advised to seek resolution through 
reference to local financial division dispute resolution mechanisms such as the 
financial division of the Shanghai Courts.  In the long term, prospects for greater 
strengthening of national mechanisms such as CIETAC and the Securities Dispute 
Resolution scheme will provide additional avenues of recourse. 
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 See Shanghai Fayuan Falu Wenchu Jiansuo Zhongxin at 
http://www.hshfy.sh.cn:8081/flws/list.jsp#. 
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